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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
John Doe, a former inmate of the Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections, is HIV-positive. He was 
informed by the medical staff at the State Correctional 
Institution at Pittsburgh (SCIP) that his medical condition 
would be kept confidential. However, because of certain 
practices permitted by prison officials, Doe's condition was 
not kept confidential. Doe sued under 42 U.S.C.S 1983, 
claiming that prison practices violated his right to medical 
privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment and under the 
Pennsylvania Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information 
Act, 35 P.S. S 7601 et seq. The District Court granted 
defendants' motions to dismiss the S 1983 claims on the 
basis of qualified immunity, declined jurisdiction over the 
state claims, and dismissed the case. 
 
Although we ultimately agree that defendants ar e entitled 
to qualified immunity, we do not agree with the District 
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Court's reasoning. We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment 
protects an inmate's right to medical privacy, subject to 
legitimate penological interests. However , because this right 
was not clearly established at the time of defendants' 
conduct, we will affirm the dismissal of Doe's complaint. 
 
I. FACTS 
 
John Doe arrived at SCIP on January 11, 1995. Shortly 
thereafter, Doe was informed by the medical staff that he 
was HIV-positive. After signing a written consent of 
disclosure form, he was told that his medical condition 
would be kept confidential and that medical r ecords 
relating to his illness would be maintained separately from 
his general prison file. 
 
Because of certain procedures permitted by defendants, 
Doe's condition was not kept confidential. Specifically, 
when Doe was taken for sick call appointments, staf f 
informed the escorting officers of Doe's medical condition. 
During physician visits, staff kept the door to the clinic 
room open, allowing officers, inmates, and guards in the 
area to see and hear Doe and the treating physician. 
Finally, while administering medication, nurses announced 
his medication loudly enough for others to hear , allowing 
inmates to infer Doe's condition. Doe filed administrative 
grievances concerning the sick call and medication 
distribution practices, but the grievances did not bring 
about any change in the practices. 
 
On July 11, 1997, Doe, proceeding pr o se, filed suit 
under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 and the Pennsylvania 
Confidentiality of HIV-Related Infor mation Act, 35 P.S. 
S 7601 et seq. in the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania. The complaint named as 
defendants Joan Delie, Health Care Administrator at SCIP; 
Dr. Paul Noel, Medical Director of SCIP; Diane Manson, a 
Nurse/Grievance Officer; and Sophie Swika and Kim 
Zimmerman, both nurses at SCIP. Doe claimed his 
constitutional right to privacy was violated by the"open- 
door" examination room policy, by the disclosure of his 
medical condition to corrections officer escorts, and by the 
loud announcement of the names of his medications. He 
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alleged that these practices made him reluctant to discuss 
embarrassing symptoms with doctors, subjected him to 
psychological harassment and humiliation, and caused him 
to discontinue treatment. Doe requested declaratory and 
injunctive relief, as well as nominal, compensatory, and 
punitive damages. 
 
On August 5, 1997, Doe filed motions for a temporary 
restraining order and a preliminary injunction ordering 
defendants to provide for nondisclosure of his medical 
information during sick call visits and medication 
distribution. The Magistrate Judge recommended that both 
motions be denied pending service of the complaint and 
motions on defendants. This Report and Recommendation 
was adopted by the District Court on September 16, 1997. 
 
After service of the complaint,1 defendants Delie, Manson, 
and Swika, and defendant Noel by separate motion, moved 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Doe was granted leave to 
file an amended complaint and did so on Mar ch 3, 1998. 
The amended complaint added James Price, the 
superintendent of SCIP, as a defendant and otherwise 
reasserted Doe's privacy claims. Defendants r easserted 
their motions to dismiss based, inter alia, on the defense of 
qualified immunity, which shields public officials from 
actions for damages unless their conduct was unr easonable 
in light of clearly established law. 
 
The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and 
Recommendation on September 21, 1998. The Magistrate 
found that no clear federal constitutional right to 
nondisclosure of an inmate's medical condition exists and 
recommended dismissal of defendants Delie, Manson, 
Swika, and Price on grounds of qualified immunity. The 
Magistrate found that the only involvement alleged as to 
defendant Noel was his inadequate response to Doe's 
grievances, which did not give rise to a S 1983 claim. In 
addition, the Magistrate Judge found, sua sponte , that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Nurse Zimmerman was never served with pr ocess in the district court. 
She is not a Commonwealth employee, and was appar ently referred to 
SCIP through a private nursing facility. Ef forts to locate her at that 
agency were unsuccessful. 
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defendant Zimmerman was entitled to qualified immunity 
for her alleged misconduct and recommended dismissal of 
the complaint against her pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Finally, the Magistrate Judge 
recommended that the District Court decline to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over Doe's state law claims. 
 
Over Doe's objections, the District Court adopted the 
Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation and 
dismissed the case on December 17, 1998. On January 13, 
1999, Doe filed his notice of appeal of the District Court's 
decision. We appointed counsel for Doe and have benefitted 
as a result from counsel's willingness to undertake this 
representation. 
 
Shortly before oral argument, counsel informed us that 
Doe was awaiting a re-trial on his conviction. Counsel has 
now informed us that Doe was acquitted in his re-trial, and 
therefore is no longer an inmate at SCIP . 
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
Doe's S 1983 claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 1331 and over 
the state law claim under 28 U.S.C. S 1367. W e have 
appellate jurisdiction over the District Court'sfinal 
judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. W e exercise 
plenary review over the District Court's dismissal of a 
complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to 
state a claim. Piecknick v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 
36 F.3d 1250, 1255 (3d Cir. 1994). W e must accept as true 
all of the factual allegations in the complaint as well as the 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn fr om them. Moore 
v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1993). We may 
dismiss the complaint only if it is clear that no r elief could 
be granted under any set of facts that could be pr oved 
consistent with the allegations. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 
467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
Because Doe is no longer an inmate at SCIP, we must 
first consider whether his claims are moot before reviewing 
the District Court's qualified immunity analysis. 
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A. MOOTNESS 
 
The Constitution limits the power of the federal judiciary 
to the resolution of "cases and contr oversies." See U.S. 
Const. art. III, S 2, cl.1. Federal courts ar e not empowered 
to decide moot questions. North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 
244, 246 (1971) (per curiam). The mootness doctrine 
requires that an actual controversy exist at all stages of 
review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed. New 
Jersey Turnpike Auth. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light, 772 
F.2d 25, 31 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 
We have stated that "mootness has two aspects: (1) the 
issues presented are no longer `live' or (2) the parties lack 
a cognizable interest in the outcome." Id. As a result of his 
acquittal, Doe is no longer an inmate at SCIP . It is clear 
that any declaratory or injunctive relief with respect to the 
staff at SCIP would have no impact on him, and therefore 
his equitable claims are moot. 
 
Doe argues that his case falls into the "capable of 
repetition, yet evading review" exception to the mootness 
doctrine. The exception is limited to cases which have two 
elements: "(1) the challenged action was in its duration too 
short to be fully litigated to its cessation or expiration and 
(2) there is a reasonable likelihood that the same 
complaining party would be subjected to the same action 
again." Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F .3d 195, 206 (3d Cir. 
1993) (emphasis omitted), quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 
423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)(per curiam). Given the length of 
time it took Doe, proceeding pro se  and in forma pauperis, 
to reach this stage of the litigation, we will assume, 
arguendo, that the first element is satisfied. 
 
However, as a result of his acquittal, we simply cannot 
conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood that he would 
be subjected to the same conduct. See Weinstein, 423 U.S. 
at 149 (former inmate's challenge to par ole decisions 
mooted upon his release from supervision); see also Abdul- 
Akbar, 4 F.3d at 206 (cautioning against"conjecture" that 
prisoner could again be incarcerated at maximum security 
unit and holding prisoner's release from maximum security 
unit mooted challenge to law library in maximum security 
unit).2 Doe is no longer incar cerated at SCIP. Because there 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. But see Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F .3d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 1994) (no 
discussion of mootness, although facts state plaintiff was released from 
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is no reasonable likelihood that Doe will be subjected to the 
same action, Doe's acquittal has clearly mooted his claims 
for declaratory and injunctive relief. 
 
Nonetheless, where a plaintiff has r equested several 
forms of relief and some of the r equests become moot, the 
court must still consider the viability of the r emaining 
requests. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. State of New 
Jersey, 772 F.2d 35, 40 (3d Cir. 1985). "[T]he availability of 
damages or other monetary relief almost always avoids 
mootness." Id. at 41.3 Therefore, we must review the 
District Court's qualified immunity analysis with respect to 
Doe's nominal and punitive damages claims. 
 
B. A PRISONER'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN MEDICAL 
RECORDS 
 
Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, 
acting under the color of state law, deprives another 
individual of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by 
the Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983. This section does not create any new substantive 
rights, but it provides a remedy for the violation of a federal 
constitutional or statutory right conferred elsewhere. Baker 
v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
prison prior to appeal). The Sixth Circuit r eached the merits to dismiss 
the privacy claim of an HIV-positive prisoner , but, as discussed in 
footnote six, infra, the substantive law of privacy in the Sixth Circuit 
conflicts with that of the Third Circuit. 
 
3. While the District Court did not consider the effect of S 803(d)(e) of 
the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(e), on Doe's 
claims, we have since recognized that S 1997e(e) prohibits compensatory 
damages for mental or emotional injury absent allegations of physical 
injury. Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2000). However, 
S 1997e(e) does not bar claims seeking nominal damages to vindicate 
constitutional rights, nor claims seeking punitive damages to deter or 
punish egregious violations of constitutional rights. Id. Therefore, while 
Doe's claims for compensatory damage are barr ed by S 1997e(e), his 
claims for nominal damages survive. Moreover , to the extent that Doe's 
punitive damages claims stem solely from the violations of his right to 
medical privacy, and not from any emotional or mental distress suffered, 
those claims are not barred by S 1997e(e). See id. at 252. 
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When the defendant in a S 1983 action claims qualified 
immunity, a court must first determine if the plaintiff 's 
allegations are sufficient to establish the violation of a 
federal constitutional or statutory right. W ilson v. Layne, 
526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999), citing Conn v. Gabbert , 526 U.S. 
286, 290 (1999).4 If the plaintif f 's allegations meet this 
threshold, a court must next determine whether the right 
that the defendant's conduct allegedly violated was a clearly 
established one, about which a reasonable person would 
have known. Id. If the plaintiff 's allegations fail to satisfy 
either inquiry, then a defendant is entitled to qualified 
immunity and dismissal of the case. Deciding "this purely 
legal question permits courts expeditiously to weed out 
suits which fail the test without requiring a defendant who 
rightly claims qualified immunity to engage in expensive 
and time consuming preparation to defend the suit on its 
merits." Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991). 
 
With this framework in mind, we must deter mine 
whether an HIV-positive inmate has a right to privacy in his 
medical information. If so, we must deter mine whether that 
right was clearly established in 1995. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Notwithstanding the fact that the Supr eme Court has twice stated in 
mandatory, unqualified language that "[a] court evaluating a claim of 
qualified immunity must first deter mine whether the plaintiff has alleged 
the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all . . ." Wilson, 
526 
U.S. at 609 quoting Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. at 290 (internal 
quotations omitted) (emphasis added), Judge Garth's dissent would 
prefer that we skip the first prong of qualified immunity analysis. See 
Dissent, infra at p. 40. This practice ignor es the Supreme Court's 
express language and creates an exception based on the procedural 
posture of the case. While there may be pragmatic considerations 
favoring Judge Garth's qualification of the Supr eme Court's unqualified 
language, the Court has not yet suggested any basis for departing from 
the rule articulated in Wilson. Our thr eshold task here, in qualified 
immunity analysis, is to determine whether Doe has alleged a violation 
of a constitutional right. We hold that he has, although the full extent 
of 
that right in the prison setting has yet to be delineated. Whether and 
how prison officials must accommodate, or may curtail and even 
extinguish that right, in light of the penological interests concerned, is 
not before the Court today. 
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1. 
 
An individual has a constitutional right to privacy which 
protects "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of 
personal matters." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 
(1977). We have long recognized the right to privacy in one's 
medical information: "There can be no question that . . . 
medical records, which may contain intimate facts of a 
personal nature, are well within the ambit of materials 
entitled to privacy protection." United States v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980). 
The right to privacy in one's medical information extends to 
prescription records. Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 
72 F.3d 1133, 1138 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied 519 U.S. 
808 (1996) [hereinafter "Doe v. SEPT A"]. In Doe v. SEPTA, 
we acknowledged that the privacy interest in information 
regarding one's HIV status is particularly strong because of 
the stigma, potential for harassment, and "risk of much 
harm from non-consensual dissemination of the 
information." Id. at 1140. 
 
The District Court recognized Doe's right to privacy in his 
medical information, but concluded that such a right does 
not exist in prison. We disagree. As the Supreme Court has 
noted, prison inmates do not shed all fundamental 
protections of the Constitution at the prison gates. Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974). Inmates r etain those 
rights that are not inconsistent with their status as 
prisoners or with the legitimate penological objectives of the 
corrections system. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 
(1974). 
 
For example, prisoners retain rights af forded by the First 
Amendment. O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). 
They retain the protection of due pr ocess, Wolff, 418 U.S. at 
555, and the protection against racial discrimination. Lee v. 
Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (per curiam). Of 
course, prisoners retain the Eighth Amendment's protection 
against cruel and unusual punishment. Wilson v. Seiter, 
501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991). While many rights survive 
incarceration, however, it is clear that some rights retained 
by free citizens are necessarily extinguished by 
imprisonment. 
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The defendants correctly assert that prisoners do not 
have a Fourth Amendment right to privacy in their cells. 
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 529 (1984). The Supreme 
Court has concluded that the Fourth Amendment right to 
privacy, to be free from unreasonable searches, is 
fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration. Id. at 527. 
Mindful that internal security is a chief concern in prisons, 
the Court recognized that it would be impossible to prevent 
the introduction of weapons, drugs and other contraband 
into the premises if prisoners maintained a right of privacy 
in their cells. Id. Therefore,"the Fourth Amendment has no 
applicability to a prison cell." Id. at 536. 
 
However, Doe's asserted right to privacy in his medical 
information is completely differ ent than the right 
extinguished in Hudson. See, e.g., Powell v. Schriver, 175 
F.3d 107, 112 n.3 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting right to 
confidentiality of medical information is distinct from right 
of privacy implicated in Hudson); Anderson v. Romero, 72 
F.3d 518, 522 (7th Cir. 1995) (same). The Hudson court 
confirmed that a Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures is inconsistent with 
incarceration. In the instant case, Doe is asserting his 
Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy in his medical 
information. The right to nondisclosur e of one's medical 
information emanates from a different source5 and protects 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Fourth Amendment prohibits the gover nment from conducting 
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. While 
courts and commentators have emphasized the privacy interests 
protected by the Fourth Amendment, the Supr eme Court has clarified 
that the Fourth Amendment "protects individual privacy against certain 
kinds of governmental intrusion, but its pr otections go further, and 
often 
have nothing to do with privacy at all." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 350 (1967). 
 
There are at least two types of privacy pr otected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment: the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters, and the right to autonomy and independence in personal 
decision-making. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600; Westinghouse, 638 
F.2d at 577. Cases in the latter category describe the liberty interests 
in 
matters relating to marriage, procr eation, contraception, family 
relationships, and child rearing and education. See e.g. Troxel v. 
Granville, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (2000) (parents' rights to make decisions 
 
                                10 
  
different interests than the right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. Compare Whalen, 429 
U.S. at 598-99 with Hudson, 468 U.S. at 525. 
 
It is beyond question that information about one's HIV- 
positive status is information of the most personal kind and 
that an individual has an interest in pr otecting against the 
dissemination of such information. See Doe v. SEPTA, 72 
F.3d at 1140; Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 577. Moreover, a 
prisoner's right to privacy in this medical infor mation is not 
fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration. Therefore, 
we join the Second Circuit in recognizing that the 
constitutional right to privacy in one's medical information 
exists in prison. See Powell, 175 F.3d at 112. 
 
We acknowledge, however, that a prisoner does not enjoy 
a right of privacy in his medical information to the same 
extent as a free citizen. We do not suggest that Doe has a 
right to conceal this diagnosed medical condition fr om 
everyone in the corrections system. Doe's constitutional 
right is subject to substantial restrictions and limitations in 
order for correctional officials to achieve legitimate 
correctional goals and maintain institutional security. 
 
Specifically, an inmate's constitutional right may be 
curtailed by a policy or regulation that is shown to be 
"reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." 
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Courts must 
respect the administrative concerns underlying a prison 
regulation, without requiring proof that the regulation is 
the least restrictive means of addressing those concerns. 
We have summarized the analysis as follows: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
concerning care and custody of childr en); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973) (right to abortion); Loving v. Vir ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) 
(freedom 
to marry); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to marital 
privacy in use of contraceptives); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510 (1925) (parents' right to teach own childr en); Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to teach foreign language). As described 
above, Doe's privacy interest clearly falls into the first category. Some 
courts have referred to the first category as a "right to 
confidentiality," to 
distinguish it from the right to autonomy and independence in personal 
decision making. E.g. Powell v. Schriver , 175 F.3d 107, 113-14 (2d. Cir. 
1999). 
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       [Turner] directs courts to assess the overall 
       reasonableness of such regulations by weighing four 
       factors. First, there must be a valid, rational 
       connection between the prison regulation and the 
       legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify 
       it, and this connection must not be so remote as to 
       render the policy arbitrary or irrational. Second, a 
       court must consider whether inmates retain alternative 
       means of exercising the circumscribed right. Third, a 
       court must take into account the costs that 
       accommodating the right would impose on other 
       inmates, guards, and prison resour ces generally. And 
       fourth, a court must consider whether there ar e 
       alternatives to the regulation that fully accommodate 
       the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid 
       penological interests. 
 
Dehart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 51 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 
Appellant alleges that his constitutional right to privacy 
in his medical information was violated by thr ee practices: 
the "open-door" examination room policy, the disclosure of 
his medical condition to corrections officer escorts, and the 
loud announcement of the names of his medications. Doe 
concedes that the "open door" examination r oom policy 
could conceivably be justified by a legitimate security 
interest but contends that no such inter est has been 
advanced here. In addition, Doe maintains that the other 
disclosures are unrelated to any legitimate penological 
interests, and thus violated his right to privacy. 
 
Given the disposition of the case by the District Court, 
defendants did not have the opportunity to come forward 
with any evidence of legitimate penological inter ests, costs 
of accommodating Doe's privacy interest, or availability of 
alternatives to the disclosures made her e. Based on this 
undeveloped record, we are unable to assess any of the 
Turner factors. Rather than speculating about these factors, 
we ordinarily would remand for consideration by the trial 
court on those issues. However, we need not decide those 
issues in this case because of our disposition of the second 
prong of the qualified immunity analysis. 
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2. 
 
As stated earlier, the qualified immunity doctrine shields 
public officials from actions for damages unless their 
conduct was unreasonable in light of clearly established 
law. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). We 
have recognized that qualified immunity applies if 
"reasonable officials in the defendants' position at the 
relevant time could have believed, in light of what was in 
the decided case law, that their conduct would be lawful." 
Good v. Dauphin County Social Servs. for Childr en & Youth, 
891 F.2d 1087, 1092 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
Thus, having determined that Doe has alleged a violation 
of a constitutional right, we must determine whether Doe's 
right to privacy was "clearly established" in a 
"particularized" sense. Anderson v. Cr eighton, 483 U.S. 635, 
640 (1987). "The contours of the right must be sufficiently 
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what 
he is doing violates that right." Id. W e do not require precise 
factual correspondence between the right asserted and 
prior case law. Good, 891 F.2d at 1092. Whether an official 
may be protected by qualified immunity tur ns on the 
"objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in 
light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the 
time it was taken." Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 
(1999) (internal quotes omitted). The issue is whether, given 
the established law and the information available to 
Defendants, reasonable prison officials in Defendants' 
positions could have believed that their conduct was lawful. 
See Paff v. Kaltenback, 204 F.3d 425, 431 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
Appellant makes three arguments in support of his 
contention that his right to privacy in his medical 
information was clearly established in 1995. First, Doe 
argues that a Pennsylvania statute both cr eates a right and 
serves to inform defendants of the existence of that right. 
Second, Doe argues that, by 1995, a "gr owing consensus" 
of other courts had held that inmates possess a right to 
privacy in their medical records. Finally, Doe argues that 
the class action settlement in Austin v. Pennsylvania Dept. 
of Corrections, 876 F. Supp. 1437 (E.D.Pa. 1995), put 
defendants on specific notice of the existence of a prisoner's 
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constitutional right to privacy in his medical infor mation. 
We address each argument in tur n. 
 
The Pennsylvania Confidentiality of HIV-Related 
Information Act, 35 P.S. S 7603, became effective March 1, 
1991. Under the Act, any person who obtains confidential 
HIV-related information in the course of providing health or 
social services, or pursuant to consent, may not disclose 
the information, except by consent, or to certain designated 
persons. 35 P.S. S 7607. The state right is enforceable in a 
private cause of action for damages. 35 P.S.S 7610. Doe 
contends that he consented to the HIV test but did not 
consent to the various disclosures made by defendants. 
While Doe concedes that the state statute cannot be the 
basis for his federal action, he argues that prison officials 
could not have been acting "reasonably" when they were in 
direct violation of a clear state statute; they thus lost the 
protections of qualified immunity. 
 
This argument misinterprets the ef fect of a state law on 
a federal constitutional claim. The Supreme Court has held 
that officials do not forfeit qualified immunity from suit for 
violation of a federal constitutional right because they failed 
to comply with a clear state statute. Davis v. Scherer, 468 
U.S. 183, 195 (1984); see also D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks 
Area Vocat'l Tech. School, 972 F.2d 1364, 1375-76 (3d Cir. 
1992) (en banc) ("[I]llegality under the state statute can 
neither add to nor subtract from the constitutional validity 
of a state's actions.") (internal quotes and citation omitted). 
To overcome qualified immunity, Doe's clearly established 
right must be the federal right on which the claim for relief 
is based.6 Claims for violations of the Pennsylvania 
Confidentiality of HIV-Related Infor mation Act can be 
vindicated in state courts, or, as Doe did here, as a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. For example, state law may bear upon a claim under the Due Process 
clause when the property interest pr otected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment is created by state law. See Boar d of Regents v. Roth, 408 
U.S. 564, 577 (1972); Acierno v. Cloutier , 40 F.3d 597 (3d. Cir. 1994). A 
federal statute can provide the clearly established right when it is the 
basis for the action. See, e.g. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) 
(vindicating rights under Social Security Act). This case involves neither 
situation. 
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supplemental claim. But the state statute cannot"clearly 
establish" the federal right for qualified immunity purposes. 
 
Second, a review of decisions which had addr essed the 
issue by 1995 reveals that no court of appeals had held 
that prisoners retained a constitutional right to the privacy 
of their medical information. In fact, only a handful of 
district court opinions had done so. 
 
The earliest circuit opinion addressing the issue analyzed 
a prison policy of segregating HIV-positive inmates from the 
general prison population. Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 
1495, 1515-1521 (11th Cir. 1991). In Harris, the Eleventh 
Circuit stated that the "precise natur e and scope of the 
privacy right at issue in this case is rather ill-defined." Id. 
at 1513. Nevertheless, the court assumed, ar guendo, that 
HIV-positive inmates had a "constitutionally-protected 
privacy interest" in nondisclosure of their medical 
information. The court acknowledged that "the scope of 
such a right, however, is far from settled, and we need not 
divine its precise parameters here," Id. at 1513 n. 26, 
because it found that the Department of Corr ections' 
decision to segregate such inmates from the general prison 
population served a legitimate penological inter est in 
reducing the transmission of HIV and reducing the threat 
of violence. Id. at 1521. 
 
Prior to 1995, other courts of appeals likewise upheld the 
segregation of HIV-positive inmates fr om the general 
population. See, e.g. Camarillo v. McCarthy, 998 F.2d 638, 
640 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993) (reserving question of whether HIV 
segregation policy is constitutional but holding officers 
entitled to qualified immunity); Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 
268, 271 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding HIV segr egation policy 
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests).7 Of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. By 1995, the Sixth Circuit had explicitly held that the right of 
privacy 
is not implicated at all by prison official's disclosure of an inmate's 
HIV 
status. See Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994). However, 
Sixth Circuit law conflicts with our cir cuit on this issue because the 
Sixth Circuit does not recognize the right to privacy in one's medical 
information in any setting. Compare J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th 
Cir. 1981) (no right to privacy in "social histories" and medical records) 
with United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 
1980) (right to privacy in medical recor ds). 
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course, the nature of the disclosures in HIV housing 
segregation cases is different than the disclosures Doe 
challenges here. 
 
In 1995, the Seventh Circuit considered disclosures that 
are closer to the ones that occurred in the present case. 
Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 1995). In 
Anderson, the prison superintendent told a guar d, in the 
presence of another guard, to make sur e inmate Anderson 
was in a cell by himself because he was HIV-positive. The 
information was repeated to at least one other guard. The 
Anderson court recognized a "qualified constitutional right 
to confidentiality of medical records and medical 
communications" outside of prison, but concluded that it 
was an open question as to whether the right applied in the 
prison setting. Id. at 522. The court r ejected two district 
court opinions which had found that nonsystematic 
disclosures of HIV status had violated HIV -positive inmates' 
right to privacy and instead relied on the fact no appellate 
court had yet recognized the right. Id. at 523-25 (discussing 
Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874 (W.D.Wis. 1988) aff 'd 
899 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1990) (table) and Rodriguez v. 
Coughlin, 1989 WL 59607 (W.D.N.Y. 1989). The Anderson 
court concluded that the officials were entitled to qualified 
immunity because, if such a right existed, it was not clearly 
established in 1992 nor in 1995.8Id. at 524. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The appellate cases illustrate the problem identified by the Supreme 
Court in qualified immunity cases: "[T]he generally sound rule of 
avoiding determination of constitutional issues does not readily fit the 
situation presented here [because] when liability is claimed on the basis 
of a constitutional violation, even a finding of qualified immunity 
requires some determination about the state of constitutional law at the 
time the officer acted. What is more significant is that if the policy of 
avoidance [of constitutional issues] wer e always followed in favor of 
ruling on qualified immunity whenever ther e was no clearly settled 
constitutional rule of primary conduct, standar ds of official conduct 
would tend to remain uncertain, to the detriment both of officials and 
individuals. An immunity determination, with nothing more, provides no 
clear standard, constitutional or non-constitutional . . . . therefore the 
better approach is to determine the right before determining whether it 
was previously established with clarity." County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 
523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998). See also W ilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 
609 (1999). 
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We note that Doe has cited several district court cases 
which concluded, by 1995, that inmates have a right to 
privacy in their medical information. See Austin v. 
Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 876 F . Supp. 1437 
(E.D.Pa. 1995) (approving class action settlement including 
policies regarding treatment of HIV positive inmates); 
Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(failure to provide qualified interpr eters violated deaf 
inmates' right to privacy); Faison v. Parker, 823 F. Supp. 
1198 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (disclosure of inmate's medical 
conditions in presentence report did not violate right to 
privacy); Nolley v. County of Erie, 776 F . Supp. 715 
(W.D.N.Y. 1991) (HIV-positive inmate's right to privacy 
violated by involuntary segregation and placing red stickers 
on his documents); Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F . Supp. 1234, 
1238 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (granting preliminary injunction to 
halt involuntary segregation of HIV-positive inmates); 
Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 876 (W.D. Wis. 1988), 
aff 'd 899 F.2d 17 (7th Cir . 1990) (table) (gratuitous 
disclosure of HIV-positive status to guar ds and inmates 
violated constitutional right to privacy). 
 
Of course, all of these opinions are factually and legally 
distinguishable from the present case. Both Nolley and Doe 
v. Coughlin are HIV-positive inmate segregation cases. 
These cases conflict with the subsequent appellate HIV 
segregation cases, which upheld the practice. 9 See 
Camarillo, 998 F.2d at 640; Moor e, 976 F.2d at 271; Harris, 
941 F.2d at 1515-21. Likewise, the district court decision in 
White v. Woods was specifically considered and rejected by 
the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Anderson v. Romero. 72 
F.3d at 525 (holding prisoners had no clearly established 
right to privacy in medical records in 1995). In Faison, the 
district court found that disclosure of an inmate's medical 
conditions in a court-ordered presentence report did not 
violate the inmate's right to privacy. 823 F . Supp. at 1205. 
And Clarkson v. Coughlin addressed deaf inmates, not HIV- 
positive ones. 898 F. Supp. at 1024. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. These opinions also conflict with other New York district court cases 
which upheld the segregation of HIV-positive inmates. See Baez v. 
Rapping, 680 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Cordero v. Coughlin, 607 F. 
Supp. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
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In short, none of these decisions, individually or 
collectively, makes it sufficiently clear to r easonable officials 
that their conduct violated a prisoner's federal 
constitutional right. District court opinions may be relevant 
to the determination of when a right was clearly established 
for qualified immunity analysis.10 However, in this case, the 
absence of binding precedent in this cir cuit,11 the doubts 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. See Hayes v. Long, 72 F.3d 70, 73-74 (8th Cir. 1995) (looking to all 
decisional law, including Supreme Court, cir cuit courts, district courts, 
and state court opinions for clearly established rights); Tribble v. 
Gardner, 860 F.2d 321, 324 (9th Cir . 1988)(same). We note that the 
Fourth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits do not look to district court 
decisions to determine if rights are clearly established. See, e.g., Anaya 
v. Crossroads Managed Care Sys., Inc., 195 F.3d 584, 594 (10th Cir. 
1999) (considering only Supreme Court, forum circuit, highest state 
court, or clearly established weight of authority fr om other circuit 
courts); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro 178 F.3d 231, 251 (4th Cir. 
1999)(considering only Supreme Court, forum cir cuit and highest state 
court); Jenkins by Hall v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 826 
n.4 (11th Cir.) cert. denied, Jenkins ex rel. Hall v. Herring, 522 U.S. 
966 
(1997)(same). The Second and Seventh Circuits consider district court 
opinions as evidence of the law but hold that they cannot clearly 
establish the law of the circuit. Anderson , 72 F.3d at 525; Jermosen v. 
Smith, 945 F.2d 547, 551 (2d Cir. 1991). The Sixth Circuit has held that 
a district court must find binding precedent from the Supreme Court, 
the Sixth Circuit, or from itself. Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. 
Seiter, 858 F.2d 1171, 1177 (6th Cir . 1988). 
 
We have held that district court decisions do not establish the law of 
the circuit, and are not even binding on other district courts within the 
district. Threadgill v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 928 F.2d 1366, 1371 
(3d Cir. 1991). Yet, as our prior decisions have illustrated, district 
court 
opinions do play a role in the qualified immunity analysis. See e.g. Pro 
v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283 (3d Cir . 1996) (affirming district court's 
reliance on Fifth Circuit opinion and two district court opinions to find 
clearly established right in qualified immunity analysis); cf. Brown v. 
Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097 n.13 (3d Cir . 1990) (accepting the use of out 
of circuit and district court opinions in qualified immunity analysis but 
reversing because opinions had been render ed after conduct in 
question). 
 
11. The absence of circuit precedent does not mean an official will always 
retain the immunity defense. "The easiest cases don't even arise." United 
States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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expressed by the most analogous appellate holding, 
together with the conflict among a handful of district court 
opinions, undermines any claim that the right was clearly 
established in 1995. 
 
Finally, we address Doe's argument r egarding the 
settlement in Austin v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 
876 F. Supp. 1437 (E.D.Pa. 1995). In Austin, the district 
court accepted a negotiated settlement between a class of 
inmates and the Pennsylvania Department of Corr ections 
over numerous prison conditions, including medical care. 
As part of the settlement, the DOC agreed to keep inmates' 
medical information regarding their HIV status confidential 
and to advocate a universal precautions policy instead of a 
notification policy in future union negotiations. Id. at 1453. 
Doe argues that, in light of the Austin  settlement, prison 
officials could not reasonably believe that non-consensual 
disclosures of an inmate's HIV status wer e lawful. 
 
We agree that, in some ways, the Austin settlement is 
more persuasive than the scattered district court opinions 
previously discussed. Austin has significant factual 
correspondence to Doe's case. In addition, the opinion 
documents the participation of the DOC in lengthy 
negotiations regarding treatment of HIV-positive inmates to 
settle the class action. Cf. Buckley v. Rogerson , 133 F.3d 
1125, 1130-31 (8th Cir. 1998) (district court class action 
judgment against Missouri state prison system clearly 
established right for Iowa state prisoner to over come 
qualified immunity defense). 
 
Nevertheless, Austin is also less persuasive than other 
district court opinions. Rather than providing a decision on 
the legal merits of the claims, the Austin court merely 
approved a settlement. As the Austin court itself noted, it 
"only evaluate[ed] the probable outcome of the litigation 
and [was] not required to weigh and decide each 
contention." Austin, 876 F. Supp. at 1464 n.16. The Austin 
court's statement about the constitutionality of disclosing 
an inmate's medical information was in r esponse to 
proposed, and rejected, courses of conduct.12 The legal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The Austin court stated: "One gr oup of inmates objects to the 
Settlement Agreement because they believe the provisions which ensure 
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conclusion regarding the constitutional right to privacy was 
dictum. It was not binding on the parties and it certainly 
did not clearly establish a constitutional right. 
 
Nor can the fact that the DOC agreed to settle a case 
clearly establish a federal constitutional right. The law 
favors settlement, particularly in class actions and other 
complex cases, to conserve judicial resour ces and reduce 
parties' costs. See In Re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck 
Fuel Tank Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 
General Motors v. French, 516 U.S. 824 (1995). Where, as in 
Austin, the factual and legal issues wer e numerous, broad 
and complex, the decision to settle a case cannot be 
elevated to the recognition of a constitutional right. 
 
Based on the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the 
cited authorities, individually or in combination, clearly 
established an inmate's constitutional right to privacy in 
his medical information. Government officials must stay 
abreast of constitutional developments, but they are not 
"expected to predict the future course of constitutional 
law." Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. at 617. We conclude that 
the contours of defendants' legal obligations under the 
Constitution were not sufficiently clear in 1995 that a 
reasonable prison official would understand that the non- 
consensual disclosure of a prisoner's HIV status violates 
the Constitution. Accordingly, we will affir m the District 
Court order granting Defendants qualified immunity from 
Plaintiff 's claims.13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the anonymity of HIV-infected inmates ar e too stringent. These inmates 
want the DOC to test all inmates and notify the general population of 
those inmates who are HIV-positive. Such a notification procedure is 
unrelated to any penological interest and would most likely violate state 
law . . . and the Constitution of the United States." Austin, 876 F. Supp. 
at 1466. With respect to the Turner factors, however, the Austin court 
stated that "there was no assurance that this Court would order an 
elimination of the notification provision. Although individuals have an 
interest in preventing disclosure of their HIV status which is protected 
by state law and the Constitution, inmates' rights must necessarily yield 
to a certain extent to legitimate penological inter ests." Id. at 1467. 
 
13. We will likewise affirm the District Court's order dismissing Nurse 
Zimmerman pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for qualified 
immunity and declining supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. 
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3. 
 
Although the exact boundaries of such a right have yet to 
be established, we hold today that prison inmates r etain a 
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to 
privacy in their medical information. The exact parameters 
of a prisoner's right to privacy in that infor mation will have 
to be determined in a later case on a mor e complete record, 
where the Turner factors can be fully considered in the 
context of the penological interests concer ned. Moreover, 
because we are granting qualified immunity to the 
defendants, we also do not go on to the issue of the 
standard that is utilized to determine whether a prisoner's 
right to privacy in his medical information has been 
violated. That determination too will have to wait for 
another day. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment pr otects an 
inmate's right to medical privacy, subject to legitimate 
penological interests. However, because this right was not 
clearly established at the time of defendants' conduct, we 
will affirm the District Court's dismissal of Doe's complaint 
on the basis of qualified immunity. 
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NYGAARD, concurring and dissenting: 
 
I agree with Judge Roth's conclusion that prisoners have 
a right to privacy in their medical information, and that 
this right may be compromised only if it conflicts with a 
legitimate penological objective that satisfies the criteria 
outlined in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254 
(1987). I would conclude, however, that Doe's right to 
privacy in medical matters was clearly established at the 
time of the alleged violations such that Appellees, as 
reasonable employees of the Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections, should have known that the right existed and 
therefore cannot be dismissed from defending these 
allegations on the basis of qualified immunity. Hence, I 
dissent from the conclusions contained in Section III, B. 2 
of Judge Roth's opinion. 
 
It is now axiomatic that the doctrine of qualified 
immunity bars government officials fr om liability for 
damages unless they disobeyed "clearly establish[ed] 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a r easonable 
person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982). Debates over 
defendants' qualified immunity typically tur n on this 
"clearly established right" clause. The Supr eme Court has 
unpacked the meaning of Harlow by pr oviding the following 
analytic parameters: For a right to be clearly established, 
the "contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a 
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing 
violates that right," Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 
640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039 (1987). Nonetheless, at the same 
time, a court need not have ruled on a case bearing a 
"precise factual correspondence" with the one under 
consideration. Assaf v. Fields, 178 F .3d. 170 (3d Cir. 1999), 
cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 374 (1999). Thus, gover nment 
officials are not barred from the protection of qualified 
immunity if they fail to predict fluctuations in legal debates. 
They will not, however, be granted immunity if they fail to 
make obvious inferences from a generally established right, 
to its application in particular situations. 
 
The question is whether these members of the 
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections should have 
known from 1995 through 1997 that prisoners possessed a 
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right to the privacy of their medical recor ds. I proceed to 
my conclusion as follows: 
 
First, we have recognized the right to confidentiality in 
medical records since 1980. United States v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir . 1980). We stated in 
Westinghouse that medical recor ds, which "may contain 
intimate facts of a personal nature, ar e well within the 
ambit of materials entitled to privacy protection. 
Information about one's body and state of health is a 
matter which the individual is ordinarily entitled to retain 
within the private enclave where he may lead a private life." 
Id. at 577 (citations omitted). Those infected with HIV are 
often subjected to discrimination, ridicule, and violence, 
and therefore by 1995 we recognized the heightened 
importance of respecting the medical privacy of HIV 
carriers. See Doe v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. 
Auth., 72 F.3d 1133, 1140 (3d Cir . 1995) (noting not only 
the importance of maintaining the privacy of medical 
records but also the corollary r esponsibility of maintaining 
the confidentiality of prescriptions for medications used to 
treat AIDS.); see also Doe v. City of New Y ork, 15 F.3d 264 
(2d Cir. 1994); Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 
376 (D.N.J. 1990). Thus the constitutional right to privacy 
of medical information in the non-prison context was well 
established at the time the defendants here"leaked" the 
information about Doe. 
 
Likewise, the standard for determining the legitimacy of 
an infringement on a prisoner's constitutional right, such 
as the right to confidentiality in medical r ecords, was well 
established by 1995. In Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. 
at 2257, the Supreme Court determined that any alleged 
violation of a prisoner's right will be unwarranted unless it 
is determined to be "reasonably r elated to legitimate 
penological interests." See also W ashington v. Harper, 494 
U.S. 210, 110 S.Ct. 1028 (1990); O'Lone v. Estate of 
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 107 S.Ct. 2400 (1987); Monmouth 
County Corr. Inst. v. Lanzara, 834 F .2d 326, 343 (3d Cir. 
1987). Turner provided four questions to guide our analysis. 
First, is there a valid and rational connection between the 
regulation or activity and the legitimate gover nmental 
interest? Second, is there an alter native means for the 
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prisoner to exercise the right? Third, will accommodating 
the right cause an unreasonable burden on the staff, other 
inmates, or prison resources? Fourth, is there another 
obvious means to accomplish the prison's objective? The 
Court's intention in fashioning this test was "to formulate 
a standard of review for prisoners' constitutional claims 
that is responsive both to the policy of judicial restraint 
regarding prisoner complaints and [to] the need to protect 
constitutional rights." Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. at 
2257 (citations omitted). 
 
Although we have given "[p]rison officials . . . broad 
discretion in fashioning appropriate r esponses to legitimate 
penological objectives consistent with the constitutional 
rights of inmates," Monmouth County, 834 F.2d at 343, 
Turner demands that the responses at issue reasonably 
serve a valid penological interest. The courts must not, 
therefore, allow our analysis to be obscur ed by bald 
assertions from prison officials who claim that the policy in 
question serves a legitimate end. Expressing some 
frustration that the Turner standar d was being misapplied, 
the Supreme Court restated its purpose and application in 
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 110 S.Ct. 1028 (1990). 
"We made quite clear," Justice Kennedy admonished, "that 
the standard of review we adopted in Turner applies to all 
circumstances in which the needs of prison administration 
implicate constitutional rights." Id. at 223, 110 S.Ct. at 
1038. 
 
Well before 1995, therefore, officials for the Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections should have known 1) that a 
constitutional right to privacy in medical r ecords exists, 
particularly for HIV-related infor mation, and 2) that under 
Turner, prisoners do not forfeit constitutional rights except 
when those rights cannot reasonably be r econciled with 
legitimate penological objectives. With these two premises 
well known, I would expect reasonable prison officials to 
infer that they cannot arbitrarily violate a prisoner's right to 
privacy in medical information. In this situation, the 
"contours of the right [were] sufficiently clear" for Appellees 
to understand that they were violating Doe's 
constitutionally protected right. Anderson , 483 U.S. at 640, 
107 S.Ct. at 3039. 
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Next, I believe that a "consensus of cases of persuasive 
authority" had been established by 1995. W ilson v. Lane, 
526 U.S. 603, 616, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 1700 (1999). The 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had pr esumed the 
existence of the right to privacy in HIV-r elated medical 
information for prisoners by 1991. See Harris v. Thigpen, 
941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991). Likewise, in 1992 the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit r eviewed segregation 
of HIV-positive inmates under the Tur ner test, finding that 
the identification and segregation of HIV -positive prisoners 
"obviously serves a legitimate penological inter est," and 
thereby acknowledging the existence of a prisoner's right to 
privacy in medical information that can only be abrogated 
by a legitimate penological objective. Moor e v. Mabus, 976 
F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 
In 1993, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that 
inmates have a constitutionally protected privacy interest in 
nondisclosure of confidential medical infor mation 
concerning their HIV status. Faison v. Parker, 823 F. Supp. 
1198 (E.D. Pa. 1993). Although the court recognized this 
right, it ultimately held that the disclosur e of such 
information in a presentencing report served the state's 
compelling and countervailing interest of utilizing this 
knowledge to provide an appropriate sentence and care 
regimen. The balance of interests favor ed disclosure 
because the medical information was not included in the 
public record, was treated as confidential, and was 
provided only to the appropriate officials. Thus, by 1993 the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania recognized the right to 
privacy in inmates' HIV-related medical information and 
further understood that this right could be compr omised 
only by the need to meet a compelling and incompatible 
government interest. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
reinforced this ruling in Austin v. Pennsylvania Dept. of 
Corr., 876 F. Supp. 1437 (E.D. Pa. 1995), which I will 
discuss in more detail below. 
 
A series of other District Courts reached the same 
conclusion by 1995. Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F. Supp. 
1019, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("Prison inmates retain a 
constitutional right to privacy concerning medical 
information about them."); Nolley v. County of Erie, 802 F. 
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Supp. 898 (W.D.N.Y. 1992); Inmates of N.Y. State with 
Human Immune Deficiency Virus v. Cuomo, No. 90-CV-252, 
1991 WL 16032, *3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1991)("[T]he federal 
Constitution protects against the unwarranted and 
indiscriminate disclosure of the identity of HIV-infected 
individuals and of their medical records; that is to say, the 
court accepts . . . the proposition that the constitutional 
right of privacy extends to such matters, and that prisoners 
enjoy such a privacy right. . . ."); Bor ough of Barrington, 
729 F.Supp. at 384 ("The government's interest in 
disclosure here does not outweigh the substantial privacy 
interest involved. The government has not shown a 
compelling state interest in breaching the Does' privacy."); 
Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Wis. 1988), aff 'd 
without opinion, 899 F.2d 17 (7th Cir . 1990);1 Rodriguez v. 
Coughlin, No. 87 Civ. 1577E, 1989 WL 59607 (W .D.N.Y. 
June 2, 1989); Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F . Supp. 1234, 1238 
(N.D.N.Y. 1988) ("[I]n recognition of the particularly 
personal nature of the information potentially subject to 
disclosure under the state's program, the court determines 
that the prisoners subject to this program must be afforded 
at least some protection against the non-consensual 
disclosure of their diagnosis.") 
 
Appellees argue, and Judge Roth agrees, that these cases 
do not constitute a proper consensus. T o the contrary, I 
agree with the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 
which explained that "[i]n the absence of binding precedent, 
a court should look to all available decisional law, including 
decisions of state courts, other circuits and district courts." 
Norfleet v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Services , 989 F.2d 
289, 291 (8th Cir. 1993); see also Buckley v. Rogerson, 133 
F.3d 1125, 1129-30 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding a right clearly 
established on the basis of decisions from out of circuit 
district courts). We should remember that the Supreme 
Court has recently made clear that all that is required to 
defeat claims of qualified immunity is a "consensus of cases 
of persuasive authority," and not a consensus of binding 
authority. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 616. Thus although a lone 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Judge Roth states that the Seventh Circuit "rejected" Woodsin 
Anderson v. Romero, 72, F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 1995). This is not entirely 
accurate. The court in Anderson merely declined to reach the question. 
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District Court opinion may not secure a right, when that 
opinion is combined with opinions from the Supr eme Court, 
Courts of Appeals, and a variety of District Courts, then I 
would conclude that the right was established to an extent 
sufficient to notify the officials. 
 
Two other factors render the officials' failure to recognize 
Doe's right to privacy in his medical recor ds still more 
unreasonable. First, The Pennsylvania Confidentiality of 
HIV-Related Information Act, 35 P .S. S 7603, which became 
effective on March 1, 1991, provides a statutory right to 
nondisclosure. Section 7607 states: 
 
       (a) Limitations on disclosure.--No person or employee, 
       or agent of such person, who obtains confidential HIV- 
       related information in the course of pr oviding any 
       health or social service or pursuant to a release of 
       confidential HIV-related information under subsection 
       (c) may disclose or be compelled to disclose the 
       information. 
 
The statute makes no exception for inmates, as it states 
that HIV-related information can be disclosed to 
 
       [e]mployees of county mental health/mental 
       retardation agencies, county childr en and youth 
       agencies, county juvenile probation departments, 
       county or State facilities for delinquent youth, and 
       contracted residential providers of the above-named 
       entities receiving or contemplating residential 
       placement of the subject, who: 
 
        (i) generally are authorized to receive medical 
       information; and 
 
        (ii) are responsible for ensuring that the subject 
       receives appropriate health care; and 
 
        (iii) have a need to know the HIV-r elated information 
       in order to ensure such care is pr ovided. 
 
Id. Because no exception is made for adult prisoners, and 
all other exceptions are clearly stated, the Department of 
Corrections should have known by March 1991 that 
prisoners possess a right to the privacy of their HIV-related 
information. Considering the specificity of the statute, and 
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its precise applicability to the facts of this case, the right 
under review was clearly established in 1991. 
 
Appellees, and Judge Roth, claim that a state statute is 
irrelevant to the issue of qualified immunity on a federal 
claim. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194-97, 104 
S.Ct. 3012, 3019-21 (1984). I disagree. As the Supreme 
court explained in Elder v. Halloway, Davis held that 
 
       an official's clear violation of a state administrative 
       regulation does not allow a S 1983 plaintiff to overcome 
       the official's qualified immunity. Only in this context is 
       the Court's statement comprehensible: `A plaintiff who 
       seeks damages for violation of constitutional or 
       statutory rights may overcome the appellee official's 
       qualified immunity only by showing that those rights 
       were clearly established . . .' Davis, in short, concerned 
       not the authorities a court may consider in 
       determining qualified immunity, but this entirely 
       discrete question: Is qualified immunity defeated where 
       an appellee violates any clearly established duty, 
       including one under state law, or must the clearly 
       established right be the federal right on which the 
       claim for relief is based? The Court held the latter. 
 
510 U.S. 510, 515, 114 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 (1994) (citations 
omitted). 
 
The reason why I disagree with Judge Roth is that 
although a state statute will not, by itself, place an official 
on notice of a federal right, to me such a statutory right 
should raise the official's awareness that a parallel federal 
right may exist. Such a warning should facilitate a 
reasonable official's ability to make the inference discussed 
above. This position is congruent with the objectives of the 
doctrine of qualified immunity. If a state statute clearly 
articulates a right, and places those within its jurisdiction 
on notice of that right, and if that right per fectly coincides 
with a federally protected right, then why would we not 
consider the statute's existence when determining whether 
the offender should have known of the federal right? I think 
we should. Indeed it seems to me that a state statute, 
locally promulgated, and free from many of the 
uncertainties of case law, most effectively notifies the 
community of a protected right, and reinforces federal law. 
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Regardless of how a person learned of the right, and 
regardless of whether she thought she was violating state 
or federal law, she knew that a right existed and that she 
was violating it. The purpose of qualified immunity is to 
protect government officials fr om having to defend 
themselves in litigation over rights and duties that they did 
not know they were violating. Here, the Appellees were 
clearly notified by the 1991 statute that Doe was entitled to 
the privacy of his medical records under state law. The 
inference that prisoners were entitled to the same right 
under federal law was implicit by 1995. If we allow the state 
statute to play no role in assessing whether or not the 
officials should have known of the federal right, then we 
allow officials to turn a blind eye to the general state of the 
law and discourage them from making a good faith effort to 
recognize such implicit principles. I consider this good faith 
effort to be within the responsibilities of a "reasonable 
official." 
 
In addition, as powerful evidence that these officials 
knew they were violating Doe's right to privacy, in an 
opinion establishing a right to privacy for inmates' HIV- 
related medical records, Austin v. Pennsylvanian Dep't of 
Corr., the very agency and officials before us now were also 
appellees in that case. In that opinion in January 1995, the 
Court stated that the "DOC has agreed to keep inmates' 
medical information regarding HIV status confidential and 
to advocate a universal precautions policy in place of the 
current Contagious Disease Notification Policy in its 
forthcoming negotiations with the union repr esentative of 
its custody staff." Austin, 876 F . Supp. at 1453. This 
decision alone directly notified Appellees of their obligation 
to protect Doe's privacy right. As Judge Roth correctly 
states, court approval of a settlement does not provide a 
legal decision regarding the constitutionality of the 
elements of the settlement. But that is not the test. The 
court clearly warned the very institution before us in this 
matter that it risked constitutional violations by disclosure. 
Indeed the language the Court used was that disclosure of 
a prisoner's HIV-related medical infor mation, if "unrelated 
to any penological interest . . . would most likely violate 
state law, and the Constitution of the United States." Id. at 
1437. Austin explained that "[a]lthough individuals have an 
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interest in preventing disclosure of their HIV status which 
is protected by state law and the Constitution, inmates' 
rights must necessarily yield to a certain extent to 
legitimate penological interests," and then clearly stated the 
criterion of the Turner test. Id.  In light of this notification, 
it seems disingenuous to claim that the officials here 
deserve protection from Doe's claims because they did not 
know that they could not arbitrarily disclose a prisoner's 
medical information.2 
 
       In summary, the combination of the preponderance of 
case law, the state statute, and the Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections' previous agr eement to respect 
privacy in prisoners' HIV-related materials, clearly 
established the right in question. I would find that, taken 
together, these factors defeat Appellees' claim to qualified 
immunity. I therefore respectfully dissent from this aspect 
of the Majority's decision. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Finally, I note that the manner in which this delicate information was 
disseminated indicates to me that the officials knew they were 
misbehaving, but persisted in doing so regar dless of the fact that they 
were mistreating Doe. 
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GARTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting and concurring. 
 
I agree with Judge Roth that the District Court's decision 
dismissing Doe's complaint should be affir med because the 
defendants have qualified immunity from Doe's claims. 
However, I cannot agree that, on this r ecord brought before 
us on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,1 we can or should declare 
that "a constitutional right to privacy in one's medical 
information exists in prison." (Roth Op. at 11.) This case is 
one of first impression, and Judge Roth's holding, with 
which Judge Nygaard concurs as to the constitutional right,2 
may have a multitude of ramifications in this Cir cuit where 
major prisons abound. It is for that reason that I write 
separately contesting the creation of a constitutional right 
of privacy and confidentiality for prisoners. 3 
 
It is true that, in so holding, Judge Roth qualifies this 
statement, observing that "Doe's constitutional right is 
subject to substantial restrictions and limitations in order 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. A motion brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 
is granted only if: "taking the allegations of the complaint as true, . . 
. 
and viewing them liberally giving plaintiffs the benefit of all inferences 
which fairly may be drawn therefrom, . . .`it appears beyond doubt that 
the plaintiff[s] can prove no set of facts in support of [their] claim 
which 
would entitle [them] to relief.' "Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 
434, 
444 (3d Cir. 1977) (internal citations omitted). 
 
2. For ease of reference, I will r efer to Judge Roth's holding throughout 
this dissent and concurrence, although Judge Nygaard constitutes her 
majority with respect to the establishment of a constitutional right to 
privacy in prison. 
 
3. In her footnote 3, relevant to her discussion of mootness, (see Roth 
Op., Part III.A), Judge Roth asserts that S 1997e(e) of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") does not bar claims for punitive damages, 
relying on Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F .3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2000). I 
disagree with her analysis, because I believe that this case is far more 
similar to Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342 (D.C.Cir. 1998), 
where the D.C. Circuit held that an inmate's punitive damages claims 
were barred by the PLRA. We distinguished Davis in Allah "because 
those claims [in Davis] stemmed fr om the allegations of emotional and 
mental injury [suffered as a r esult of the violation of Davis' 
constitutional 
right to privacy]." 226 F.3d at 252. As a consequence, contrary to Judge 
Roth, I would hold that Doe's punitive damages claim is barred by the 
PLRA, although I agree that the claim for nominal damages prevents our 
dismissing Doe's action as moot. 
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for correctional officers to achieve legitimate correctional 
goals and maintain institutional security." (Roth Op. at 11.) 
Nevertheless, because she and I agree that such a 
constitutional right of privacy in prison has not been and is 
not clearly established, the prudential and wiser course of 
action in this case is to decline to determine that such a 
constitutional right has been established at all . 
 
I. 
 
The record before us in this case is naked of anything 
other than Doe's allegations in his complaint--allegations 
which complain of a lack of privacy and confidentiality as 
well as a violation of his grievance/appeal rights. 4 However, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. That statement of Doe's claim alleges: 
 
       - Doe is a death row prisoner; 
 
       - After submitting to a blood test, Doe was informed by the prison 
       medical staff that he was HIV-positive and that this medical 
       condition would be kept confidential; 
 
       - He has undergone medical examinations and tests in the open 
       presence of correctional officers and other inmates; 
 
       - The clinic door is kept open when Doe is seen by doctors and 
       specialists from the Centers for Disease Contr ol (CDC), so that 
       correctional officers can see Doe; 
 
       - When Doe has an appointment with a CDC specialist, the 
       correctional officers who escort him to the appointment are 
       informed of the nature of the appointment; 
 
       - On one occasion, a nurse announced aloud the names of the 
       medications being delivered to Doe in the pr esence of other 
       inmates and that nurse told a corrections officer about Doe's 
       condition; 
 
       - In connection with Doe's internal grievance about the sick call 
       procedure, he was interviewed by a medical grievance officer 
       whom Doe told that another inmate twice over heard a nurse 
       stating the name of Doe's medication when delivering it to him; 
 
       - Doe's internal grievance, which contained information about his 
       HIV-positive status, was forwarded to the superintendent of the 
       prison; 
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we have not been informed and do not know whether Doe, 
who was a death penalty prisoner, was r equired to be 
closely guarded at all times by prison guar ds, thereby 
virtually ensuring that the guards would be privy even to 
private conversations. We do not know the construction and 
dimensions of the medical area or medication dispensary at 
SCI-Pittsburgh--whether there ar e communal examination 
rooms or private examination cubicles. W e do not know the 
location of Doe's death penalty cell in the Restricted 
Housing Unit ("RHU"), or the route, access, and distance 
from his cell to the medical area. W e do not know the 
circumstances under which medication is dispensed at sick 
call--the structure and configuration of the dispensary, the 
location in the dispensary of physicians, nurses, guards, 
and other prisoners, or the manner in which prisoners 
receive medication (are they separately scheduled or are 
they scheduled in a group or in an open line?). Nor do we 
know the administrative complexities encounter ed by 
prison authorities in ensuring the manner in which each 
prisoner receives the correct medication. We do not know 
the state of the security precautions in the dispensary area 
as compared to the security in the RHU, nor do we know 
the required provisions for security in the passageways 
between the two areas. 
 
All that we do know from Doe's complaint is 1) that the 
clinic door is kept open when Doe is seen by doctors and 
CDC specialists so that Doe may be viewed by corr ections 
officers,5 and 2) that, when Doe receives his medication, the 
medication is sometimes referred to by name. Moreover, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       - Prison officials responded to Doe's internal grievance by 
       informing him that the nurses denied his allegations and that the 
       door had to be left open when Doe was being examined by 
       specialists and doctors due to a "security issue"; and 
 
       - His appeal rights had been affected by being obliged to go 
       through the superintendent prior to appeal tofinal review. 
 
(App. 15a-19a.) 
 
5. Judge Roth acknowledges that Doe has conceded that this practice 
may be justified by the prison's legitimate security concerns. (Roth Op. 
at 12.) 
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because, on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, no response or 
information is available from, in this case, the prison 
authorities, we have no knowledge of the physical, 
structural, or security conditions in prison that contribute 
to and may generate a diminished expectation of privacy or 
confidentiality.6 
 
Prisons are communal environments in which a large 
number of inmates and prison employees coexist in a 
confined living space. For this reason, inmates have little 
physical privacy, and the circumstances of medical 
treatment may not conform to private, non-prison norms. 
Prisoners must do everything in close proximity to other 
inmates and prison personnel, including sleeping, eating, 
dressing, bathing, and, to a certain extent, r eceiving 
medical attention. 
 
II. 
 
Another reality of prison life is the fact that prison 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Because, as noted, this is an appeal fr om a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, 
the defendants have not been able to inform us of their actions, 
procedures, regulations, explanations, or justifications in response to 
Doe's complaint. (See text infra, discussing the inadvisability of 
creating 
constitutional rights based on a naked recor d consisting only of the 
prisoner-plaintiff 's allegations.) It is not only impossible to analyze 
the 
factors identified in Turner (connection between regulation and 
justification; alternative means of exer cising right; costs of 
accommodating right; and alternatives to the r egulation), as even Judge 
Roth acknowledges (see Roth Op. at 12 ("defendants did not have the 
opportunity to [produce] any evidence of legitimate penological interests, 
costs. . . , or availability of alternatives. . .")), but it is similarly 
hopeless 
to draw upon instruction from the "privacy?" cases cited by both Judge 
Roth and Judge Nygaard. This is so because, her e, there are no factual 
circumstances that can be likened or compar ed to the circumstances 
described in the cases my colleagues have cited, almost all of which are 
non-prison cases or are inapposite for some other reason and, therefore, 
are not relevant in any event. See, e.g., Doe v. Southeastern Pennsylvania 
Transp. Auth., 72 F3d 1133 (3d Cir . 1995) (non-prison case); United 
States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F .2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980) (non- 
prison case); Moore v. Mabus, 976 F .2d 268 (5th Cir. 1992) (does not 
establish privacy right); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 
1991) (does not establish privacy right). 
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resources are limited. Prison systems are generally in this 
day and age overcrowded and understaf fed. Therefore, 
accommodation of prisoners' privacy and confidentiality 
demands, their needs, and even their rights cannot be 
assumed or declared in a vacuum. Considering the 
communal nature of prison existence, similar in many 
privacy (or lack of privacy) aspects to life in the military, 
together with the limited and often insufficientfinancial 
resources of prisons, I believe it to be rash and imprudent 
to hold at this time, without much more infor mation about 
prison security concerns, that Doe has a constitutional 
right to privacy in his HIV-positive status, any more than 
he has a constitutional right of privacy in his cell. See 
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1984). 
 
I recognize, of course, that the rationale of Hudson, 
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, dealt with the lack 
of privacy an inmate has in his cell accommodation, 
whereas here our attention is drawn to rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the "penumbras" of rights 
encompassing privacy. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (holding that "specific guarantees in 
the Bill of Rights have penumbras," one of which is the 
right of privacy). However, certainly Doe's expectation of 
privacy and confidentiality of medical infor mation in a 
communal dispensary setting cannot be deemed to be 
greater than his expectation of privacy in his cell, 
depending, of course, on all of the circumstances which I 
have noted above and as to which we have no infor mation. 
 
Indeed, I take issue with Judge Roth's assertion that 
"Doe's asserted right to privacy in his medical information 
is completely different than the right extinguished in 
Hudson." (Roth Op. at 10.) After all, in Hudson, the 
Supreme Court declined to declare a constitutional right 
because "[t]he recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in 
their individual cells simply cannot be reconciled with the 
concept of incarceration and the needs and objectives of 
penal institutions," 468 U.S. at 526, wher eas, here, Judge 
Roth has declared a constitutional right, but has held that 
"Doe's constitutional right is subject to substantial 
restrictions and limitations in order for correctional officials 
to achieve legitimate correctional goals and maintain 
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institutional security." (Roth Op. at 11.) If there are 
concerns, as evidently Judge Roth has her e, that 
"legitimate correctional goals" and "institutional security" 
may be jeopardized by the exercise of Doe's purported 
constitutional right, it would seem to me only prudent that 
we should withhold declaring a constitutional right of 
privacy until we have obtained the information we lack. 
 
That is the course of action that the Supreme Court took 
in Hudson, where the Court decided the very limited 
question of a prisoner's Fourth Amendment privacy right in 
his cell on an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, 
not a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion, and 
even Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1999), which 
Judge Roth cites in support of her declared constitutional 
right, went to full trial before the Second Cir cuit announced 
that a constitutional right had been established. 
 
I believe that we can analogize Doe's situation to the 
Supreme Court's rationale in Hudson, where the Court, as 
noted, held that prisoners do not have a Fourth 
Amendment right to privacy in their cells. Doe's complaint 
includes claims of violation of his privacy, violation of 
confidentiality, and violation of his rights under the 
grievances and appeal procedures. My r eading of Doe's 
complaint reveals that it is the privacy  aspect on which Doe 
has focused and which has caused his distress. But, the 
question that then arises is whether Doe had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy concerning his HIV -positive status. 
In this respect, I believe we can look to Hudson, where the 
Court stated: 
 
       Determining whether an expectation of privacy is 
       "legitimate" or "reasonable" necessarily entails a 
       balancing of interests. The two inter ests here are the 
       interest of society in the security of its penal 
       institutions and the interest of the prisoner in privacy 
       within his cell. The latter interest, of course, is already 
       limited by the exigencies of the circumstances: A prison 
       "shares none of the attributes of privacy of a home, an 
       automobile, an office, or a hotel room." We strike the 
       balance in favor of institutional security, which we 
       have noted is "central to all other corrections goals." A 
       right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms 
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       is fundamentally incompatible with the close and 
       continual surveillance of inmates and their cells r equired 
       to ensure institutional security and inter nal order. We 
       are satisfied that society would insist that the 
       prisoner's expectation of privacy always yield to what 
       must be considered the paramount interest in 
       institutional security. We believe that it is accepted by 
       our society that "[l]oss of freedom of choice and privacy 
       are inherent incidents of confinement." 
 
Hudson, 468 U.S. at 527-28 (internal citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). So too is the privacy inter est implicated 
in this case "limited by the exigencies of the 
circumstances," namely the communal natur e of prison life, 
the logistical problems with prisoner confidentiality in 
prison medical facilities, and the need for prisoners, 
especially death row prisoners such as Doe, to be watched 
closely by prison guards. Therefor e, I believe that, 
depending upon the prison information as to which we are 
still ignorant, Doe's right to privacy in the communication 
of his medical information may be "fundamentally 
incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of 
inmates" as was the Fourth Amendment right in Hudson.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. I should note that the connection between the prison's security 
interest and the deprivation of Doe's right to privacy is less direct here 
than in the Fourth Amendment context. In Hudson , the Supreme Court 
observed that prison officials must be able to maintain prison safety by 
entering inmate's cells to search for weapons and contraband. Here, 
Doe's right to privacy is overshadowed and diminished by the general 
need to monitor and guard prisoners and by the very nature of a forced 
communal living environment, both of which make it difficult to preserve 
a prisoner's privacy. 
 
Moreover, I believe that the balancing of interests prescribed by the 
Supreme Court in Hudson whereby expectations of privacy must be 
balanced against legitimate penological and security interests cannot be 
undertaken unless and until those interests ar e known and spread upon 
the record. Until that time, I cannot subscribe to or hold that prisoners 
have the same privacy interests as the general non-prison population 
enjoys. I also believe that, when the balancing equation is completed, it 
will weigh in favor of institutional security and against prisoners' 
unrealistic expectations of privacy as it does in the Fourth Amendment 
context. 
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See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) ("challenges 
to prison restrictions that are asserted to inhibit First 
Amendment interests must be analyzed in ter ms of the 
legitimate policies and goals of the corrections system, to 
whose custody and care the prisoner has been committed 
in accordance with due process of law"). 
 
Thus, the realities of prison life compel a holding that 
Doe has not established a constitutional right to privacy on 
the record here--and certainly not in the current posture of 
this case. Though the Supreme Court has held that 
prisoners retain "those [constitutional] rights not 
fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment itself or 
incompatible with the objectives of incarceration," Hudson 
v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984), the Court has also 
observed repeatedly that "[l]awful incar ceration brings 
about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many 
privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the 
considerations underlying our penal system." 8 Price v. 
Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948). These "considerations" 
include "deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of prisoners, 
and institutional security," DeHart v. Hor n, 227 F.3d 47, 50 
(3d Cir. 2000), as well as, I believe, allocation of limited 
prison resources. Indeed, the Supr eme Court has stated: 
"because the `problems of prisons in America are complex 
and intractable,' and because courts are particularly `ill 
equipped' to deal with these problems, we generally have 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Hence, I am neither influenced nor persuaded by Judge Roth's reliance 
on Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1999), a Second Circuit case 
not binding in this Circuit and completely distinguishable because: 1) 
Powell was decided only after a full jury trial, whereas here we have a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion which takes the allegations of the complaint as 
true, see note 1, supra; 2) Powell extrapolated its privacy holding from 
Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1994), which is a non- 
prison case of privacy; and 3) Powell's emphasis was wholly on 
transsexualism--a condition with its unique pr oblems not relevant in 
Doe's case. 
 
8. The Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle most recently in Shaw v. 
Murphy, stating that "constitutional rights that prisoners possess are 
more limited in scope than the constitutional rights held by individuals 
in society at large." 121 S.Ct. 1475, 1479 (2001). 
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deferred to the judgments of prison officials in upholding 
these regulations against constitutional challenge." Shaw v. 
Murphy, 121 S.Ct. 1475, 1480 (2001) (inter nal citations 
omitted) (holding that a prisoner has no First Amendment 
right to provide legal assistance to other inmates and that, 
therefore, prison officials did not violate the prisoner's 
constitutional rights when they intercepted a letter 
containing legal advice that he sent to another prisoner). 
 
III. 
 
I also note that a decision in this case that 1) the record 
is not sufficient to establish a constitutional right but that 
2) the right was not clearly established in any event is 
consistent with the Supreme Court's dir ective in Wilson v. 
Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999). In Wilson , the Court stated 
that "[a] court evaluating a claim of qualified immunity 
`must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the 
deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all, and if so, 
proceed to determine whether that right was clearly 
established at the time of the alleged violation.' " 526 U.S. 
603, 609 (1999) (quoting Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 
290 (1999)). The Court explained that "[d]eciding the 
constitutional question before addressing the qualified 
immunity question . . . promotes clarity in the legal 
standards for official conduct, to the benefit of both the 
officers and the general public." 526 U.S. at 609. 
 
However, Wilson arose in the context of a district court's 
ruling on a summary judgment motion, not on a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, as did the other cases cited by 
the Court in Wilson. See Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286 
(1999); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 
(1998); see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991).9 This 
doctrine makes sense in the context of a summary 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Powell v. Schriver, see note 5, supra, in which the Second Circuit held 
that a transsexual prisoner had a constitutional right to privacy in that 
medical information but that the constitutional right to privacy in prison 
was not clearly established, arose in the context of a district court's 
grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict to the defendant. In that 
case, unlike this one, the Second Circuit had the benefit of a full 
factual 
record after a full jury trial. 
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judgment motion, which occurs at the close of discovery 
when a court may make a decision on the existence of a 
constitutional right with the benefit of the r elevant facts. 
 
Hence, it seems to me that the Wilson rule is not 
appropriately extended to rulings on Rule 12(b)(6) motions 
to dismiss, where the factual recor d is as scant as it is 
here. In my opinion, to construct a constitutional right out 
of the whole cloth without analysis and without any 
knowledge of the institutional factors or security concerns 
attendant to a prison population or to a penal envir onment 
appears to me to be not only improvident but, as I have 
stated, rash. Indeed, I find it highly unusual that a court 
should decide the existence of a constitutional right when 
it has essentially no record befor e it and no basis on which 
it may balance the claims made by the prisoner of privacy 
expectations against legitimate security inter ests of the 
prison. Such a decision does not "promote[ ] clarity in the 
legal standards for official conduct, to the benefit of both 
the officers and the general public," W ilson, 526 U.S. at 
609, but instead causes uncertainty and confusion by 
establishing an hitherto undeclared constitutional right 
with no discernable standards. 
 
Judge Roth in her majority opinion has responded to this 
critique and my thesis by citing two Supreme Court cases 
and declaring that the Supreme Court unequivocally 
demands that, in qualified immunity cases, the 
constitutional right first be declared befor e we address 
whether that right has been clearly established. (Roth Op. 
at 8 n.4.) I quite agree with her that the doctrine she 
invokes requires the declaration of a constitutional right as 
the first order of business. However, and this is a major 
"however," those cases to which she r efers were not cases 
decided by a district court on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See 
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 608 (1999) ("The District 
Court denied respondents' motion for summary judgment 
on the basis of qualified immunity."); Conn v. Gabbert, 526 
U.S. 286, 289 (1999) ("[Defendants] moved for summary 
judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, and the 
District Court granted the motion."). The very nature of a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, as contrasted with a summary 
judgment motion, with its concomitant standar d of review 
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(accepting all of the plaintiff 's allegations as true), is alien 
to certain types of judicial declarations (namely, 
declarations of constitutional rights). 
 
The Seventh Circuit, albeit in a differ ent context, has 
recently held that district court judges should not apply the 
Rule 12(b)(6) standard of accepting a plaintif f 's allegations 
as true when they determine whether to certify a class. The 
Seventh Circuit instructed that, "[b]efore deciding whether 
to allow a case to proceed as a class action, .. . a judge 
should make whatever factual and legal inquiries ar e 
necessary under Rule 23." Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, 
Inc., 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001). Similarly, I suggest that 
the Rule 12(b)(6) standard cannot be applied by district 
courts in first determining the existence of a constitutional 
right, because the facts and circumstances of the case, as 
they bear upon penological interests and concer ns, must be 
explored before a court can unequivocally announce a 
constitutional right. 
 
Moreover, I have great difficulty, as I envisage the bench 
and bar will also have, in identifying the contours and 
parameters of an asserted constitutional right of prison 
privacy that is still subject to the restrictions and 
limitations of penal security interests. Even Judge Roth 
admits that these restrictions, limitations, and 
accommodations have yet to be delineated. In particular, 
since the relevant penological interests are presently not 
known and may, by their very nature, cause the 
constitutional right at issue here to disappear into thin air 
or be diminished to a point of nothingness, it seems to me 
far better that we know precisely the right with which we 
are dealing before creating such a right liable to be 
dismissed on its first documented challenge. 
 
Certainly the Supreme Court could never have intended 
that a fundamental constitutional right be cr eated with no 
regard for the framework or circumstances relevant to its 
application. It is for that reason, I suggest and strongly 
urge, that it is far more prudent and r esponsible to await 
the development of an appropriate recor d before plunging 
ahead to create a fundamental right which may not ever be 
sustainable in a communal prison context. 
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Judge Roth acknowledges that the record in this case is 
undeveloped just as Doe himself "concedes that the `open 
door' examination room policy [see note 3, supra] could 
conceivably be justified by a legitimate security interest but 
contends that no such interest has been advanced here." 
(Roth Op. at 12.) Judge Roth, recognizing that we would 
ordinarily remand for consideration by the trial court of 
issues concerning legitimate penological inter ests, security 
concerns, costs of accommodating Doe's privacy interest, 
availability of alternatives, etc., did not take that course 
because the right which she has declared was not clearly 
established. 
 
I would hold that, if a record is undeveloped, as this one 
is, it cannot suffice to form the basis for the declaration of 
a constitutional right. The announcement of a 
constitutional right--an announcement which is never 
lightly reached and which inevitably has far -reaching and 
unpredictable consequences--should be gr ounded on 
unassailable legal principles and formulated based on a full 
factual record. Had Judge Roth just assumed arguendo 
that a constitutional right existed in prison, as the Eleventh 
Circuit did in Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F .2d 1495, 1513 (11th 
Cir. 1991), (which was admittedly decided before the 
Supreme Court's holding in Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 
(1999)), while I would have been uncomfortable, I would not 
have resisted her announcement as I have. But, to 
announce without reservation a full-fledged constitutional 
right of privacy in prison, as a matter of first impression, 
without a factual record, and without any substantial or 
persuasive case support, I believe transcends our r ole as 
reviewing judges. I think the declaration made in this case 
is wrong and is a grave mistake to publish as this Circuit's 
precedent. I think that we will ultimatelyfind it necessary 
to retreat from the constitutional position this panel has 
taken. 
 
IV. 
 
Accordingly, in my opinion, we are corr ect in disposing of 
this case on qualified immunity grounds, not only because 
the constitutional right was not clearly established but 
because, at this time and in the posture of the present 
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case, we should not announce a constitutional right which 
cannot be defined at this stage of the proceedings. 
 
I therefore respectfully dissent fr om Judge Roth's 
constitutional holding but concur in the final judgment, 
because I agree with Judge Roth that such a right has not 
been, and is not, clearly established and that, ther efore, the 
District Court's dismissal of Doe's action should be 
affirmed. 
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